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WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW-Pursuing the
"'Benevolent Purpose" of New Mexico's Workers'
Compensation Statute as a Reimbursement Statute:
Montoya v. AKAL Security, Inc.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Montoya v. AKAL, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the
workers' compensation statute is a reimbursement statute for the employer,
overruling almost twenty-eight years of decisions interpreting the statute
2
as an election statute for the employee.' Overruling Castro v. Bass and
its progeny, the court stated that if an employee proves "that a thirdparty release or satisfaction of judgment has not discharged fully the
employer's liability to pay benefits," the employee may still receive
3
workers' compensation benefits from the employer. If the employee deals
in good faith and at arm's length with the third-party tortfeasor, the
employer's liability is reduced by the amount received from the thirdparty.4 This Note discusses the history of workers' compensation law and
examines the supreme court's reasoning for abandoning the rule of election
and adopting the view that New Mexico has a reimbursement statute.
Finally, this Note offers a brief critique of the Montoya decision,
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On June 3, 1987, while Carmela Montoya (Montoya) was working as
a security guard at Santa Fe Vocational Technical School (School) as an
employee for AKAL Security, Inc. (AKAL), she was attacked and severely
injured.' AKAL's workers' compensation insurance carrier, Royal In6
surance Company (Royal), paid medical benefits and later temporary
7 to Montoya.
total disability benefits
initiated
A year after Montoya began receiving benefits from Royal, she
8 Montoya
injuries.
her
for
damages
recover
to
School
the
against
a suit
informed Royal that she was suing the School, and in early 1990, she9
informed Royal that she intended to settle the action against .the School.

1. 114 N.M. 354, 838 P.2d 971 (1992) (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-5-17 (1978 & Supp. 1986)).
2. 74 N.M. 254, 392 P.2d 668 (1964).
3. Montoya, 114 N.M. at 358, 838 P.2d at 975.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 354, 838 P.2d at 971.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 355, 838 P.2d at 972.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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The suit against the School was settled and was subsequently dismissed
with prejudice.' 0 Shortly after the case was dismissed, Royal terminated
Montoya's workers' compensation benefits." Montoya filed a claim to
reinstate the benefits, but AKAL successfully obtained a summary judgment barring Montoya's claim.' 2 In granting the summary judgment, the
workers' compensation judge relied on New Mexico's workers' compensation statute 3 and on Castro v. Bass14 which had held that an employee's
receipt of damages, regardless of the amount awarded or recovered was
"an award for all injuries. ' " 5 In an unpublished opinion, the New Mexico
Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of benefits. 6
The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari, and in an opinion
written by then-Chief Justice Ransom, it rejected the Castro rule relied
upon by the lower courts. 7 The supreme court adopted the view that a
worker is not automatically precluded from resuming workers' compensation benefits from an employer after the worker receives a judgment
or settlement from a third-party tortfeasor. 8 Accordingly, the supreme
court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case to the workers'
compensation judge for further proceedings under the new rule. 9
III. REIMBURSEMENT AND ELECTION STATUTES
In the United States between 1908 and 1950, workers' 20 compensation
laws were enacted by every state legislature to compensate for the injury
and death an employee might suffer in the course of his employment. 2 '
Although each jurisdiction has its own unique statute, the various statutes
generally include provisions prohibiting the employee from suing the
employer for damages, eliminating the need to prove an employer's fault,
and rendering irrelevant any employee fault. 22 All state workers' com-

10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-5-17 (1978 & Supp. 1986).
14. 74 N.M. 254, 392 P.2d 668 (1964).
15. Montoya, 114 N.M. at 356, 838 P.2d at 973, (quoting Seminara v. Frank Seminara PontiacBuick, Inc., 95 N.M. 22, 24, 618 P.2d 366, 368 (Ct. App. 1980)).
16. Montoya, 114 N.M. at 354, 838 P.2d at 971.
17. Id. at 357, 838 P.2d at 974.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 358, 838 P.2d at 975.
20. Recently, the term "workmen's compensation" has been replaced by "workers' compensation." For consistency, t 'workers'
will be used rather than "workmen's" in this Note.
21. See, e.g., WLLIAM R. DITTMAR, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 7 (2d ed. 1959); see also W.
PAGE KEETON ET A., PROSSER AND KEETON ON ta LAW OF TORTS § 80 (5th ed. 1984). Prosser
explains the need for workers' compensation laws in the following way: "Under the common law
system, by far the greater proportion of industrial accidents remained uncompensated, and the
burden fell upon the worker who was least able to support it. Furthermore, the litigation which
usually was necessary to any recovery meant delay, pressure upon the injured person to settle his
claim in order to live, and heavy attorney's fees and other expenses which frequently left him only
a small part of the money finally paid." Id. (citations omitted).
22. DITTMAR, supra note 21, at 8; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1605 (6th ed. 1990) ("The
effect of most workers' compensation acts is to make the employer strictly liable to an employee
for injuries sustained by the employee which arise out of and in the course of employment, without
regard to the negligence of the employer or that of the employee.").
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pensation statutes inherently provide for this compromise between limited
liability for the employer and virtually guaranteed but limited recovery
for the employee. Thus, the "employer [makes] substantial concessions
as the price of his limited liability; the employee 23 [gives] up his right
against his own employer to bring damage suits."
Despite the defining characteristic of this compromise between employer
and employee, the specific details of how to carry out the policy goals
vary in the state statutes, especially when an employee sues a third-party
tortfeasor. Statutes dealing with third-party tortfeasors are defined as
being either election statutes or reimbursement statutes. The two types
of statutes have different underlying philosophies and have different effects
on an employee trying to recover from an injury.
Basically, election statutes emphasize the need for the employee to
choose an action. An employee who chooses either to receive compensation
or to pursue recovery from a third-party tortfeasor may be later precluded
from pursuing the option not chosen, even if the option chosen was
unsuccessful. 24 On the other hand, reimbursement statutes limit double
any
recovery by emphasizing the employer's right to reimbursement from
25
tortfeasor.
third-party
a
from
receive
recovery the employee may
Election Statutes
Under an election statute, an employee whose injury is the result of
from
a third party's negligence must elect to pursue either compensation
26 Harsh results
tortfeasor.
third-party
his employer or damages from the
often occur under these statutes when an employee makes a poor choice
party to recover from and as a result loses any right
in deciding which
2"
recovery.
to

A.

23. 2A ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 71.20 (1990); see also PROSSER,
supra note 21, § 80 573-74:
(I)njured employees receive immediate relief, a fruitful source of friction between
the employer and the employee has been eliminated, . . . a tremendous amount of
burden and expensive litigation has been eliminated, and a more harmonious relation
between the employers and the employees exists than was possible under the old
system.
(quoting I WhAM R. SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 6 (2d ed. 1932)).
24. See Castro v. Bass, 74 N.M. 254, 258-59, 392 P.2d 668, 672-73 (1964); LARSON, supra note
23, §§ 73.00 & 73.10.
25. See, e.g., Castro, 74 N.M. at 261, 392 P.2d at 675, (Noble, J., dissenting) (discussing thirdparty recovery and stressing the reimbursement rights of the employer under the statute).
26. LARSON, supra note 23, § 73.10. Usually, the employee is barred from pursuing the second
action, regardless of which action he pursued first. "Occasionally the election works only one way;
for example, in Texas a prior third-party suit bars a compensation claim, but a prior compensation
claim does not bar a later third-party suit, although it reduces the recoverable damages by the
amount of compensation." Id. (citations omitted). In the United States, only a few jurisdictions
have election statutes. Id.
27. If a worker sued a third-party and received a verdict but no or little judgment, the worker
was precluded from receiving workers' compensation benefits. See Montoya, 114 N.M. at 356, 838
P.2d at 973 (noting that in Seminara v. Frank Seminara Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 95 N.M. 22, 24, 618
P.2d 366, 368 (Ct. App. 1980), "[tihe Court refused to deem as a nonexistent remedy an election
that results in no award.").
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Election statutes have several purported justifications, including preventing double recovery for the same injury.2 An employee is precluded
from receiving full damages for his injury from a tort action in addition
to receiving compensation for his injury from workers' compensation.
However, this justification is without merit; modern workers' compensation statutes preclude double recovery by requiring that the employer's
entire statutory liability for workers' compensation benefits be reimbursed
from the employee's recovery from the third party. 29
Another justification without merit is that the employee's pursuit of
an action against a third party might prejudice an employer's right to
reimbursement because the employee is in control of the litigation.'3
However, the employer is not really prejudiced because he is reimbursed
from any recovery the employee receives from a third-party tortfeasor . 3
Additionally, as a protective measure, some jurisdictions require that the
employee notify the employer of his intent to bring the action, 32 and
other jurisdictions require that the employee receive the employer's approval before the employee settles the action.3 3 In New Mexico, the
workers' compensation judge reviews the actions of the employee to
ensure that the employer's right to reimbursement has not been prejudiced. 34 These measures reduce the risk of prejudice to the employer by
giving the employer various degrees of control over the action against
the third-party tortfeasor.
Despite these arguments for election statutes, the statutes and their
harsh results 3 are "out of place in workers' compensation, and the
current trend is to abolish the requirement" of election.3 6
B.

Reimbursement Statutes
A majority of jurisdictions avoid the harsh rule of election and instead
interpret their workers' compensation statutes to be reimbursement sta28. See, e.g., LARSON, supra note 23, § 73.30.
29. Id.; see also Castro, 74 N.M. at 260, 392 P.2d at 674 (Noble, J., dissenting) (Employer's
right to share in recovery from third party is "not only to the extent of the compensation
then
paid but to the extent of his full liability to the employee.").
30. LARSON, supra note 23, § 73.30, at 14-363.
31. Id. at 14-364.
32. Id. (citing U.S.F. & G. Co. v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 125 A. 875 (Conn. 1924);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 181 S.E. Ill (Ga. App. 1935); Hartquist v. Tamiami
Trails Tours, 190 So. 533 (Fla. 1939); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Simmons, 193 So. 2d 446
(Fla.
1966)). Notice and consent from an employer were required before an employee could settle if
the
employee still wanted to receive workers' compensation benefits in New Mexico. See Castro,
74
N.M. at 258, 392 P.2d at 672 (interpreting White v. New Mexico Highway Comm'n, 42 N.M.
626,
83 P.2d 457 (1938)).
33. LARSON, supra note 23, § 73.30 (citing Breese v. Price, 633 P.2d 987 (Cal. 1981)).
34. In Montoya the court stressed that the worker must deal at arm's length and in good faith
with the third-party tortfeasor, or the employer might not be liable for the full amount of compensation
remaining after reimbursement. Montoya, 114 N.M. at 358, 838 P.2d at 975.
35. See LARSON, supra note 23, § 73.21. The harsh results occur when the employee makes
a
poor choice and recovers little or nothing. "[A] workman who is supposed to be within the protection
of the beneficent system of workmen's compensation can lose both compensation and common-law
rights by making a bad guess as to which is the appropriate remedy." Id.
36. Id. § 73.10. Two years prior to deciding Castro, the Supreme Court of New Mexico recognized
that the "general trend seem[ed] to be away from the requirement of election of remedies." Brown
v. Arapahoe Drilling Co., 70 N.M. 99, 104, 370 P.2d 816, 821 (1962).
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tutes. 37 Under a reimbursement statute, an employee whose injury is the
against both
result of a third-party tortfeasor's negligence may proceed
38 However, the emthe employer.
the third-party tortfeasor and against 39
ployee may not keep both recoveries. Usually, workers' compensation
statutes provide for reimbursement to the employer for any compensation
paid, and then the employee receives any excess recovery.4 The employee
therefore receives compensation, but does not receive 4'double recovery
from both the third-party tortfeasor and his employer.
C. Workers' Compensation in New Mexico
New Mexico courts have consistently recognized two general purposes
for the workers' compensation statute: to prohibit double recovery for
right to reimbursement from
the employee and to protect the employer's
42 Despite the apparent continuity
action.
third-party
a
of
the proceeds
in the courts' understanding of the statute's goals, the courts have vacillated between interpreting the New Mexico statute as an election statute
for the employee and a reimbursement statute for the employer. Vacillation
occurs when the courts favor one goal over the other and choose to
interpret the statute accordingly.
Prior to 1964, the New Mexico Supreme Court viewed the workers'
43
compensation statute as a reimbursement statute for the employer. The
court was more concerned with reimbursing the employer than with forcing
an unfair election on the employee. For example, in Kandelin v. Lee
Moor Contracting Co.," the employer contended that the statutory provision, "shall not be entitled to receive both damages and compensation,"
precluded the employee from receiving workers' compensation in addition
to later seeking damages.4 5 In response to the employer's argument, the
court stated:
[tihere might be some force to this argument if compensation from
the employer had made the plaintiff financially whole. If he had been
made financially whole, he could not expect to be paid twice for his
injuries; but compensation under said acts falls far short of making
the plaintiff financially whole. Certain necessary expenditures for
medicine and medical care were paid in full but the plaintiff loses
37. LARSON, supra note 23, § 73; see also Reed v. Styron, 69 N.M. 262, 266, 365 P.2d 912,
916 (1961) ("Many states have reimbursement statutes.").
38. LARSON, supra note 23, § 73.
39. Id. § 71.21; see also Castro, 74 N.M. at 263, 669 P.2d at 677 (Noble, J., dissenting) ("It
is clear to me that the legislature contemplated the two remedies [tort recovery and workers'
compensation] and only intended that the employee not receive two recoveries for his own benefit.").
40. LARSON, supra note 23, § 71.20.
41. Id. § 71.21.
42. See, e.g., Montoya, 114 N.M. at 355, 838 P.2d at 972 (citing Brown, 70 N.M. at. 104-05,
370 P.2d at 820).
43. Montoya, 114 N.M. at 355-56, 838 P.2d at 972-73 (citing Royal Indem. Co. v. Southern
Cal. Petroleum Corp., 67 N.M. 137, 144, 353 P.2d 358, 363 (1960)).
44. 37 N.M. 479, 24 P.2d 731 (1933).
45. Id. at 486, 24 P.2d at 734.
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one-half of his wages and receives nothing for the pain and suffering,
or for his physical impairment.Thus, the court focused on reimbursing the employer rather than on
imposing a rule of election on the employee.47 Additionally, the court's
interpretation of the statute precluded double recovery by reimbursing
the employer from the recovery from the tortfeasor for the total amount
of the benefits the employer paid." Other early New Mexico cases interpreted the statute as a reimbursement statute and met the goals of
preventing double recovery by reimbursing the employer for his liability,
without unnecessary harshness for the employee.4 9
In 1964, the supreme court in Castro v. Bass abandoned the view that
New Mexico's workers' compensation statute was a reimbursement statute.5
In Castro, the employer paid the injured employee total disability benefits
and hospital and medical expenses." When the employee then sued the
tortfeasor, the employer intervened in the case, "claiming to be subrogated
to the rights of the workman to the extent of its liability to the

workman ....

"52

The employee recovered damages from the tortfeasor,

and the court entered judgment on the employer's complaint in intervention for payments to and on behalf of the employee.5" Soon after,
the employee filed suit to continue workers' compensation, contending
that there was no double recovery because the recovery from the tort
action was inadequate and the amount recovered was less than the
employee would have been entitled to for total and permanent disability,
or for 65% disability, if the compensation was paid for the maximum
54
amount of time.
The supreme court interpreted the workers' compensation statute to
be an election statute and held that an employee who collects a judgment
from a tortfeasor is barred from subsequently seeking workers' compensation, even if the judgment against the tortfeasor is for less than
what might have been received under the workers' compensation statute. 55
The court based its decision on the need to limit the double recovery
that might arise if the employee recovered damages from a tortfeasor
and also workers' compensation from the employer.56 The court stated
that "when damages are sought and recovered from the tortfeasor, the
46. Id. (quoting McArthur v. Dutee W. Flint Oil Co., 146 A. 484 (R.I. 1929)).
47. See id.
48. Id. at 489, 24 P.2d at 736. In addition, the court held that the employee's cause of action
was still assigned pro tanto to the employer, even though the employer had sued the third-party
tortfeasor and recovered on the action. Id. at 488-89, 24 P.2d at 736.
49. See, e.g., Brown v. Arapahoe Drilling Co., 70 N.M. 99, 105, 370 P.2d 816, 820 (1962)
("The intent of the statute is to prevent double recovery, not to preclude any recovery at
all.");
Royal Indem. Co. v. Southern Cal. Petroleum Corp., 67 N.M. 137, 144, 353 P.2d 358, 363
(1960);
White v. New Mexico Highway Comm'n, 42 N.M. 626, 83 P.2d 457 (1938).
50. 74 N.M. 254, 392 P.2d 668 (1964).
51. Id. at 255, 392 P.2d at 669.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 257, 392 P.2d at 670.
55. Id. at 258, 392 P.2d at 671.
56. Id.
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amount of the recovery is for the full loss or detriment suffered by the
' 57 Notably, the Castro
injured party and makes him financially whole."
court's analysis that a tort action against a non-employer was for the
damages preceded adoption of comparative
full amount of the employee's
5
negligence in New Mexico .
The majority decision in Castro resulted in a particularly harsh rule
of election in New Mexico. 59 As the Montoya court recognized, after
Castro, a jury determination of damages, or a settlement with the third
injuries
party, regardless of how large or how small, was an award for all
6
0
compensation.
workers'
receiving
from
and barred the worker
The dissent in Castro, which was discussed at length by the Montoya
court, 6' analyzed the statute as an employer reimbursement statute rather
62
than as an election statute for the employee. According to Justice Noble,
the intent of the statute was to reimburse the employer pro tanto for
any compensation paid to the employee after the employee received a
63
recovery against a third-party tortfeasor. Thus, the statute would allow
one and only one full recovery for the employee by allowing the employer
to receive compensation not only for the benefits already paid, but also
"to the extent of his full liability to the employee."" If workers' com65
pensation benefits were paid to an employee and subsequently the
employee sought a recovery from a third party and dealt with the third
party in good faith, there would be no harm to the employer and no
double recovery for the employee. In essence, the focus of the statute
should be on good faith dealing by the employee and fair reimbursement
for the employer. "It is the prejudice to the employer's right of reimbursement by some act of the employee under such circumstances as
would prevent recoupment by the employer that prevents an66 award in
compensation after a recovery from a third-party tortfeasor." Although
Justice Noble was the minority in Castro, his analysis was discussed at
when the New Mexico Supreme
length eighteen years later in Montoya
67
conclusions.
similar
reached
Court
57. Id. at 258, 392 P.2d at 671 (citing Jackson v. Southwestern Pub. Ser. Co., 66 N.M. 458,
349 P.2d 1029 (1960)).
58. See Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981) (adopting comparative negligence
in New Mexico).
59. Montoya, 114 N.M. at 357, 838 P.2d at 974 ("The focus of Castro on double recovery
skews the purpose of Section 52-5-17 from equitable allocation of responsibility toward an unnecessarily harsh rule of election.").
60. Id. at 356, 838 P.2d at 973 (citing Seminara v. Frank Seminara Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 95
N.M. 22, 24-25, 618 P.2d 366, 368-69 (Ct. App. 1980)); see also Apodaca v. Formwork Specialists,
110 N.M. 778, 780, 800 P.2d 212, 214 (Ct. App. 1990) (interpreting Castro to require an election
of remedies); Britz v. Joy Mfg., 97 N.M. 595, 597, 642 P.2d 198, 200 (Ct. App. 1982); Security
Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Chapman, 88 N.M. 292, 296, 540 P.2d 222, 226 (1975).
61. Montoya, 114 N.M. at 356, 838 P.2d at 973.
62. Castro, 74 N.M. at 261, 392 P.2d at 674, (Noble, J., dissenting).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. It is the receipt of workers' compensation that gives the employer the right to reimbursement.
Id. at 262, 392 P.2d at 674 (Noble, J., dissenting).
66. Id. (citing White v. New Mexico Highway Comm'n, 42 N.M. 626, 83 P.2d 457 (1938)).
67. Montoya, 114 N.M. at 356, 838 P.2d at 973. Three judges concurred with Chief Justice
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MONTOYA OVERRULES CASTRO

In Montoya, the New Mexico Supreme Court returned to the reasoning
and decisions of cases prior to Castro." In its analysis, the court first
reviewed the history of the workers' compensation statute, from Kandelin
to the post-Castro cases. 69 The court also discussed the plain language
of New Mexico's workers' compensation statute 70 and then the broader
objective of the statute. 7 The court reasoned that even though the statute
evinces a legislative intent to prevent double recovery to a worker, 72 the
statute does not require an "election. ' 73
Despite the fact that language of the statute might appear to require
an election, the court stated that it did not, and in fact, the broad
objective of the statute was not to force an election, but "to achieve
an equitable distribution of the risk of loss." 7 4 Under New Mexico's
statute, an equitable distribution of the risk of loss does occur without
forcing election, because when an employee receives compensation it
automatically effects an assignment of the third-party action to the employer, and the employer is then reimbursed. 75 From this analysis, the
court observed that it was difficult to perceive of any danger of double
recovery and thus the Castro line of cases were inequitable. 76 The goals
of eliminating double recovery for the employee and also reimbursing
the employer were met without forcing an election.7 7 In essence, according
to the court, the fear of double recovery had been a driving force behind
the earlier cases forcing election on the employee, even though it had
been continuously addressed by the statute itself.7
Finally, the court offered a useful analysis of double recovery in
workers' compensation by acknowledging that workers' compensation
actions in New Mexico exist in a larger legal environment than just
Chapter 52 of the New Mexico Statutes.7 9 Despite the court's claim that

Ransom's decision, but Justice Montgomery did not participate in the decision. Id. at 358, 838
P.2d at 975.
68. Id. at 357, 838 P.2d at 974 ("Castro and its progeny hereby are overruled to the extent
that they are inconsistent with this opinion.").
69. Id. at 355-56, 838 P.2d at 972-73; Kandelin v. Lee Moor Contracting Co., 37 N.M. 479,
24 P.2d 731 (1933); Castro v. Bass, 74 N.M. 254, 392 P.2d 668 (1964).
70. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-5-17 (1978 & Supp. 1986).
71. Montoya, 114 N.M. at 357, 838 P.2d at 974 (discussing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-5-17 (1978
& Supp. 1986)).
72. "[T]he claimant shall not be allowed to receive payment or recover damages for those injuries
or disablement and also claim compensation from the employer ...
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-517 (1978 & Supp. 1986).
73. Montoya, 114 N.M. at 357, 838 P.2d at 974.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
77. Montoya, 114 N.M. at 357, 838 P.2d at 974.
78. See id.
79. In the past, the court has refused to acknowledge that workers' compensation actions are
affected by common law. Prior to Montoya, the courts were reluctant to evaluate the workers'
compensation statute with regard to such issues as comparative versus contributory negligence. See,
e.g., Taylor v; Delgarno Transp., Inc., 100 N.M. 138, 140-41, 667 P.2d 445, 447-48, (1983) (stating
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it did not overrule Castro based upon the adoption of comparative
negligence in New Mexico, 0 the court discussed the effects of several
liability and comparative negligence in reducing an employee's recovery
against a third-party tortfeasor and further limiting the chance of double
recovery.8" With the adoption of comparative negligence and several
liability, the court had rejected the concept that a cause of action was
indivisible. 2 As a result, an employee's recovery against one party may
not be for the full amount of damages if more than one party was at
fault, and the employee can no longer be said, as a matter of law, to
have been made financially whole. 3 Thus, "the ameliorative principles
of comparative negligence erode the fear of double recovery that gave
rise to imposition of the fiction that a worker elected to be made financially
whole from satisfaction of a third-party claim.""
In addition, the court also stated that a worker is not financially whole
when he receives less than the compensation to which he is entitled under
the statute. 5 Problems with satisfaction of an action against a thirdparty tortfeasor do not go to double recovery, but instead to the amount
of reimbursement or credit to the employer." With this analysis, the
court in effect eliminated the Castro rule of election.
CRITIQUE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION
For too long, workers' compensation law has been burdened by the
fiction that it is purely statutory and separate from common law." Prior
to Montoya, an injured worker sought damages from a third-party tortfeasor whose liability, after the adoption of comparative negligence, was
usually less than the full amount of the employee's damages. Common
law reduced the employee's recovery from the tortfeasor. Yet, statutory
law precluded him from seeking damages from his employer, or continuing
V.

that the workers' compensation act was not affected by the adoption of pure comparative negligence
and the abolition of joint and several liability, and holding that the workers' compensation act was
not affected by common-law changes in tort law because it is an exclusive statutory remedy).
The Montoya court may have been influenced by the legislature's recent enactment of N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 52-1-10.1 (Repl. Pamp. 1991), which reduces the employer's reimbursement proportionally
with his percentage of fault for the employee's injury. The legislature enacted this statute following
the New Mexico Supreme Court decision in Taylor, where Chief Justice Payne and Justice Sosa
dissented because of the practical effect of comparative negligence in tort actions arising in circumstances where workers' compensation was also involved. "Under current New Mexico law, a
workman will not recover the entire amount of his damages from a third-party tortfeasor if the

employer was partially negligent. Double recovery can occur only if the workers' compensation
benefits paid exceed the negligent employer's proportionate share of liability." Taylor, 100 N.M.
at 142, 667 P.2d at 449 (Payne and Sosa, JJ., dissenting).
80. Montoya, 114 N.M. at 358, 838 P.2d at 975.
81. Id.at 357-58, 838 P.2d at 974-75.
82. Id.at 357, 838 P.2d at 974, (citing Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M.
152, 157, 646 P.2d 579, 584 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982); Scott v.
Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981)).
83. Montoya, 114 N.M. at 357, 838 P.2d at 974.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id. at 358, 838 P.2d at 975.
Id.
Taylor v. Delgarno Transp., Inc. 100 N.M. 138, 141, 667 P.2d 445, 448 (1983).
See, e.g.,
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workers' compensation benefits even if his tort recovery was less than
what he might have received in compensation benefits.88 The judicial
facade that workers' compensation was statutory and isolated, despite
the fact that it existed within the legal environment of the common law,
forced the worst of all possible worlds on an injured employee. Under
comparative negligence it was impossible to receive full recovery, let alone
double recovery.
As a practical matter, the court's assertion in Montoya that it did not
rely on comparative negligence to overturn Castro9 seems unlikely. As
discussed above, 90 the recurring theme in Castro was that a tort action,
unlike other recoveries, was for the full amount of damages. 9' In light
of the fact that the Castro court relied so heavily on the distinction
between partial recoveries, such as those from workers' compensation
benefits, and full recoveries from tort actions, 92 it is hard to believe that
Castro was not overturned sooner. As soon as comparative negligence
was adopted in New Mexico, the Castro decision and analysis became
ineffective because a full recovery could never occur unless a third party
was solely and entirely responsible for the injury. Although comparative
negligence may have distributed the risk more equitably in other tort
areas, it reduced equity in workers' compensation cases.
When considering that the goal of workers' compensation is to more
equitably distribute the risk of loss, 93 it is hardly contestable that Montoya
was a good judicial decision. However, it is less clear that Montoya was
a good judicial decision based on procedural and doctrinal considerations.
If workers' compensation is truly statutory, the court should refrain from
drastically changing interpretations that have existed for almost three
decades.9 4 Perhaps more practically, the court should finally acknowledge
that workers' compensation is not purely statutory.9 5 Doctrines such as

88. See id.
89. Montoya, 114 N.M. at 358, 838 P.2d at 975 ("[lIt is not upon the doctrine of comparative
negligence that we conclude Castro was wrong. We reject the fiction that a worker has been made
financially whole when the worker has received less than the compensation and related benefits to
which [sic] entitled to under the Act.").
90. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
91. Castro v. Bass, 74 N.M. 254, 257-58, 392 P.2d 668, 671-72 (1964).
92. Id. at 258, 392 P.2d at 672 (comparing the partial recovery of compensation and full recovery
from tort action, "in this argument the plaintiff loses sight of the difference in the recovery against
a tortfeasor and the receipt of compensation payments").
93. See, e.g., Montoya, 114 N.M. at 357, 838 P.2d at 974.
94. See, e.g., Taylor v. Delgarno Transp., Inc., 100 N.M. 138, 141, 667 P.2d 445, 448 (1983)
(When addressing whether comparative negligence affected workers' compensation, the court stated
that it "would have to either ignore the Act or hold a portion of the Act unconstitutional in
addition to overruling numerous prior New Mexico cases. This is for the Legislature to do and not
the courts.") (emphasis added).
95. See Herrera v. Springer Corp., 85 N.M. 6, 14, 508 P.2d 1303, 1311 (Ct. App.) (Sutin, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting the "judicial mess of the past caused by language
used in [the workers' compensation statute]. The time has come to avoid skirting around a conflict
in decisions, error appearing therein, and vagueness of expression. A definite rule is necessary to
guide the legal profession and district courts in the future. Legislative amendment of [the statute]
is mandatory."), rev'd on other grounds, 85 N.M. 201, 510 P.2d 1072 (1973).
Although the court in Herrera was addressing another issue in workers' compensation, that of
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comparative negligence and joint and several liability should be considered
openly instead of disingenuously brushed over in judicial opinions.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In Montoya the New Mexico Supreme Court overruled its previous
decision in Castro and adopted the view that New Mexico's workers'
compensation statute is a reimbursement statute rather than an election
statute. The court rejected the fiction that an employee was made financially whole when he received less than the compensation and related
benefits to which he was entitled under the Act.9 As a result, an employee
is no longer precluded from receiving workers' compensation benefits
from his employer, pursuing an action against a third-party tortfeasor,
and then resuming his workers' compensation benefits if the recovery
against the third-party tortfeasor is less than the amount the employee
was entitled to receive under the workers' compensation statute. The
Montoya court's interpretation of the statute pursues the benevolent
purposes of the workers' compensation act.
VICKIE R. WILCOX

subrogation, Justice Sutin's statements are pertinent. At times, the concepts of subrogation and
reimbursement and the concepts of election and reimbursement seemed to be confused in New
Mexico. New Mexico does not have a subrogation statute, but the employer is assigned a right to
reimbursement. Herrera, 85 N.M. at 8, 508 P.2d at 1305. When discussing subrogation, the courts
have said the statute is not a subrogation statute but a reimbursement statute. This discussion is
different from the discussion of whether or not the underlying philosophy behind the statute is that
of a reimbursement statute or an election statute.
This confusion is exemplified in cases after Castro but prior to Montoya which referred to the
statute as a reimbursement statute when discussing subrogation. See, e.g., Schulte v. Baber Well
Serv. Co., 98 N.M. 547, 650 P.2d 831 (Ct. App. 1982); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sydow, 97 N.M.
51, 57, 636 P.2d 322, 328 (Ct. App. 1981) (Sutin, J. dissenting) (The act "has erroneously been
held to be a reimbursement statute since Kandein .... "); Herrera, 85 N.M. at 8, 508 P.2d at
1305 ("Our Supreme Court has consistently held that [the workers' compensation statute] is a
reimbursement statute .... " The statute "does not deal with the right of subrogation, but with
the right of reimbursement."); Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Chapman, 88 N.M. 29;, 296, 540
.
P.2d 222, 226 (1975) (The act "has been consistently interpreted as a reimbursement statute ...
96. Montoya, 114 N.M. at 358, 838 P.2d at 975.

